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 Abstract 
What is the impact of electoral rules on the way people make 
decisions in the voting booth? Traditionally the literature about 
electoral systems argues that the size of the district magnitude 
determines the amount of strategic voting. I argue, however, that 
different electoral systems provide incentives that potentially 
undermine or facilitate the Duvergerian logic in practice. Contrary to 
the literature the results indicate that the impact of the district 
magnitude on the frequency of strategic voting in a given polity is 
conditional on the type of seat allocation system that defines how 






Do electoral systems matter? The political consequences of electoral laws fall in two distinct 
categories. They encompass direct as well as indirect effects. The particular rules how votes 
are generated into legislative seats have a direct impact on the number and the type of parties 
in a given polity. This has profound and notorious consequences for the type of government 
and the nature of representation in general. It is well-known that the same distribution of votes 
can be translated in totally different distributions of seats in parliament using different 
electoral rules. If the outcome of an election is not just a foregone conclusion than the 
differences in the way votes are translated into seats may be a crucial determinant deciding 
who will govern and who has to stay put. 
What is the impact of electoral rules, though, on the way people make decisions in the 
voting booth? Do voters actually care about that? Do voters in some sense constrain their 
vote-choice because they anticipate the outcome of an election and include these expectations 
in their decision calculus? If voters are systematically drawn away from their most preferred 
party, just because they realize that supporting a marginal party might be equivalent to 
wasting their vote given a particular electoral institution, than we speak of an indirect effect. 
Duverger’s (1954) “psychological effects” are the prime example for these types of effects. In 
order to avoid wasting their votes, voters cast a strategic vote for viable party (or candidate)1 
although they most prefer another one. Duverger suggested that this logic should not apply to 
PR systems, since even marginal parties can expect to gain seats in such a system. 
Contrary to Duverger’s propositions, though, Leys (1959) and Sartori (1968) expect 
significant amounts of strategic voting even in PR systems – the more, of course, the smaller 
the district magnitude is, i.e., the less seats are awarded at the electoral district. The Leys-
Sartori conjecture posits that the various electoral institutions can be arrayed along a single 
                                                 
1  To simplify language I will just refer to political parties, even if voters can explicitly vote for 
candidates. Since I am looking at parliamentary elections, candidates are typically affiliated with a party list.  
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dimension defined by the district magnitude and predicts that the smaller the district 
magnitude the more strategic voting should we expect at the primary district level, i.e., at the 
level of the smallest geographic unit in which seats are allocated.  
Contrary to this literature I argue that different electoral systems provide incentives 
that potentially undermine or exaggerate the Duvergerian logic in practice and therefore 
distort systematically the relationship the literature citing Duverger, Leys and Sartori would 
expect between the levels of strategic voting in an electoral district and its district magnitude. 
The aim of this paper is to provide a hierarchy of electoral systems that helps to predict the 
share of strategic voters following the wasted-vote strategy using data of the first module of 
the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project. The advantages for 
Comparativists to use this unique data source are that we not only have comparable 
individual-level data but also systematic information about the electoral systems, particularly 
about the corresponding seat-allocation rules that determine how votes get actually translated 
into seats. Fortunately the seat-allocation rules of the participating countries vary a great deal. 
Hence one can assess its impact on the way people make up their mind in the voting booth in 
a comparative setting. Since the literature traditionally speaks to the primary district level I 
will first provide some microfundations as a set of assumptions of how those electoral rules 
play out in an individual’s decision-making process. 
 
A Comparative Look at Strategic Voting - Some Microfundations 
No matter whether you believe in Columbia, Michigan or Rochester school of thought, 
traditional theories of voting behavior have in common the prediction that voters should end-
up casting a vote for their most preferred party (or candidate). This is called a sincere vote. 
Students of strategic voting point out that we nevertheless observe systematic deviations from 
these traditional vote-choice predictions. In an attempt to model these deviations they suggest 
that voters take not merely the utility into account that a voter derives from voting for her 
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most preferred party (Upref) but also the expectation about the outcome of the election, for 
instance whether her most preferred party is actually a viable alternative to win a seat in her 
primary electoral district. It is far from clear how voters actually weight their expectations 
against their preferences. It is quite likely that different voters employ different decision rules. 
Nevertheless, the approach I am following here is to assume that a voter’s decision rule is to 
vote for that party that maximizes her expected utility from voting. 
Lets denote the probability that a voter expects her most preferred party to be viable to 
win a seat by ppref. Thus the expected utility, EU(pref), that her most preferred party is 
competitive as a viable alternative to gain a seat combines the traditional utility component 
weighted by the voters expectation. Thus  U p   EU(pref) prefpref ⋅= . This also implies that with 
probability 1- ppref no gain will be realized from voting for her most preferred party. If the 
voter is not sure whether her most preferred party is competitive than she might cast a vote for 
a less preferred party that is expected to be competitive (i.e., p = 1). This is called a strategic 
vote because the voter in such a situation does not vote for her most preferred party. Since the 
voter expects her strategic choice to be viable she will on the one hand derive the utility 
(Ustrat) from voting strategically for that party. Given that a strategic choice cannot be the 
voter’s most preferred option on gets prefstrat UU < . On the other hand, voting not for 
someone’s most preferred party might induce cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) that 
imposes additional costs (c) to the voter because of that unpleasant feeling that comes along 
with it. The expected utility of a strategic vote depends on the gain and the costs of a strategic 
vote. Thus . c-  U EU(strat) strat  =
What is needed for a cognitive dissonance to arouse? There has to be an “aversive 
event” (Cooper and Fazio 1984: 232) that the voter expects to happen when casting a strategic 
vote in order to lead to the arousal of cognitive dissonance. Such an “aversive event” could be 
that a strategic vote is perceived as a thread to voter’s self-esteem or as a vote against the 
voter’s self interest. In general perceived cognitive dissonance is expected to have behavioral 
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consequences not merely when various cognitions stay in logical contrast to one another but 
when the perceived consequences of their decision are important to the voter but nonetheless 
unfavorable. Voters, of course, at the same time are motivated to avoid that unpleasant feeling 
that comes along with cognitive dissonance. When can we expect a voter to deviate from her 
most preferred party? Formally a voter casts a strategic vote if , i.e., if   EU(pref)EU(strat) >
 
 U p c-U prefprefstrat  ⋅>  (1) 






>⋅  (2) 
 
Why should voters ever consider bearing the costs of a strategic vote, though? One suggestion 
(Cooper and Fazio 1984: 236-237) that might apply to the decision-making process in the 
voting booth is that voters could justify their strategic vote by attributing the responsibility of 
their action – not voting for their most preferred party – to the specific decision-making 
situation thereby a priori reducing the costs of a strategic vote. The specific decision-making 
situation is mainly pre-structured by the electoral rules that translate votes into parliamentary 
power. Some voters are likely to perceive the nature of the electoral system as in some sense 
coercive because it might not leave them with much maneuvering room. Take for instance a 
supporter of a small party. She might feel that her decision-making process is constraint by 
the electoral rules because in voting for “her” party she might expect to waste her vote.  
Given the utility and the costs that are expected to come with a strategic vote as 
opposed to a sincere vote, the crucial factor in equation (2) for voters whether to desert or to 
stick with their most preferred party is the expected probability whether their most preferred 
party will win a seat in their electoral district. The left part of this equation could be 
interpreted as the risk of casting a strategic vote. Holding utilities and costs constant, equation 
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(2) shows that the lower the expected probability, i.e., the more uncertain the voter is whether 
her most preferred party is able to win a seat, the more likely a strategic vote becomes. What 
factors determine these expectations? Since voting behavior is no different from any other 
behavior in that it is not only situational but also dispositional determined I am going to 
distinguish between dispositional (psychological) and situational (mechanical) criteria of how 
voters generate expectations about the probability that their vote is not wasted on her most 
preferred party. Dispositional criteria have on the one hand to do with intrapersonal 
motivations and capabilities to comprehend these situational criteria and employ them in their 
decision-making process and on the other hand they have to do with the use of appropriate 
decision heuristics. Party elites or the media are likely to provide voters with cues and - as 
“cognitive misers” (Fiske and Taylor, 1991) – voters could simply rely on various heuristics 
to simplify their decision-making process (Gschwend 2001, 22-27). Assuming that on average 
dispositional criteria do not bias the impact of situational criteria on an individual’s decision-
making process on the primary district level I am going to focus on situational criteria that 
operate at the primary district level and have an impact the proclivity to vote strategically. 
Situational criteria are derived from the logic of electoral institutions. 
 
Situational Criteria that undermine or facilitate the Duvergerian logic in practice 
The Leys-Sartori conjecture becomes relevant for the discussion of situational criteria that 
influence voters’ expectations about the probability that their vote is not wasted on her most 
preferred party. It posits that the higher the district magnitude, the less likely voters are to 
avoid wasting their vote for smaller parties and, hence, less strategic voting is expected to 
occur in that district. To put it differently, the large the district magnitude the higher the 
probability for a hypothetical voter that her most preferred party is viable. According to 
equation (2), the higher the expected probability  the less likely is a voter to deviate from 
her most preferred party. Thus, the expected probability that her vote is wasted should be 
prefp
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smaller the larger the district magnitude gets. The predicted consequences about the frequency 
of strategic voting given that the district magnitude varies have to my knowledge never been 
tested comparatively. The notion of district magnitude according to Leys (1959) and Sartori 
(1968) constitutes an universal characteristic, i.e., it does neither depend on a particular type 
of electoral or seat-allocation system nor is it a county-specific characteristic.  
It seems a bit simplistic to reduce all conceivable situational factors to be channeled 
through the size of the district magnitude. The electoral systems literature has meanwhile 
accumulated various institutional characteristics that possibly undermine the wasted-vote 
logic. Such characteristics are typically called “supradistrict factors” (Taagepera and Shugart, 
1989: 112) that compensate or correct the mechanical effect stemming from the size of the 
district magnitude. In the following I will draw attention to five situational criteria that are 
presumably consequential for strategic voting to occur on the district level. 
The first criteria is the possibility of an additional distribution of seats, so-called 
compensatory or reminder seats, that are based on regional or nationwide party vote totals. 
The possibility particularly for small parties to gain additional seats in secondary electoral 
districts on the regional or national level clearly undermines the wasted-vote logic if some 
version of a PR rule is used. Following the notation in equation (2)  is perceived to be 
higher because a vote for a small party might not be wasted after all, if there is another 
distribution of seats that helps to garner a compensatory or reminder seat for such a party. A 
good example for an electoral system with this characteristic is Belgium (although this 
characteristic is abandoned for the latest election in 2003). After a first distribution of seats in 
primary electoral districts, any remaining seats are allocated within secondary districts that are 
comprised of the Belgian provinces (Cox 1997: 48-49, Fitzmaurice 1996: 96-99). I will call 
them locally adjusted 
prefp
multi-member district (locally adjusted MMD) systems. 
Second, the existence of national thresholds provides further incentives contrary to the 
wasted-vote logic (unless the primary electoral district is on the national level, of course). A 
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supporter of a small party - even in a small district - will expect that the probability of her 
party to win a seat (although not in her district) is higher if there is a national threshold that 
has to be overcome than without one. Thus, even in a small district a supporter of a small 
party might not waste her vote after all if she cast her vote for this party. National thresholds 
provide according to this reasoning similar incentives for voters not to expect wasting their 
votes on marginal parties as in electoral systems with the possibility to get additional seats. I, 
therefore, call such systems also locally adjusted MMD systems, if seats are otherwise only 
distributed locally. If the primary electoral district is on the national level, however, than there 
are incentives to avoid wasting the vote on marginal parties since, following the above logic 
there are no further possibilities to help a marginal party to gain additional seats. The higher 
the threshold, presumably, the lower the expected probability  of a voter that a marginal 
party might gain representation and, hence, the higher her proclivity to cast a strategic vote. 
This logic gets watered down a bit, because voters might get motivated to waste their votes 
through provisions that entail even parties that fail to gain representation with additional 
bonuses short of representation, like blackmail potential, financial reimbursement of 
campaign costs (e.g. in Germany) or rules of ranking the party (higher) on the ballot for the 
next election (e.g. in Chile). 
prefp
Third, in electoral systems where the primary electoral district is the national level, so-
called national multi-member district (MMD) systems, the wasted-vote logic should be tamed 
– just mechanically and as expected because many parties actually can expect to gain 
representation. Israel and the Netherlands are examples for such electoral systems. There are 
other incentives to vote strategically, though, which do not get channeled through the (large) 
magnitude of the primary (national) district potentially attenuating the frequency of strategic 
voting. With only one national district voters might change their critical referent from a party 
frame to a coalition frame. The crucial question no longer is whether a voter’s most preferred 
party wins a seat. Instead voters might be motivated to deviate from their most preferred party 
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in order to enhance the chances of a majority for a preferred coalition. This can yield to a 
systematic desertion of small parties as well as large parties (Thurner et al, 2002). Thus, I 
expect that the frequency of strategic voting does primarily not depend on the district 
magnitude of national MMD systems. 
Forth, mixed electoral systems, like Germany, New Zealand, Hungary, Mexico or 
Japan, provide voters with the possibility to cast two votes simultaneously, using different 
rules - a candidate vote in the single-member district tier and a party vote in a multi-member 
district tier. Even if one focuses only on the votes cast in single-member districts, the wasted-
vote logic is contaminated (Cox and Schoppa 2002, Ferrara and Herron 2005, Herron 2000, 
particularly 61-64, Herron and Nishikawa, 2001, Gschwend et al. 2003) by the fact that even 
small parties field candidates although they have no chance of winning a seat. Since these 
parties compete for party votes at the same time on the multi-member district tier at 
(provincial or) national level, voters are not likely to perceive the campaigns in both tiers 
independently. Rather a local party candidate might just be recognized as a representative of 
that party, not simply independently of it. Given that their primary focus is on the national-
level and therefore the vote of the MMD tier becomes more important, as in the case of 
national MMD systems, voters might change their critical referent from a party frame to a 
coalition frame. In order to enhance the chances of a majority for a preferred coalition a 
strategic candidate vote of a small party supporter for the candidate of a major coalition 
partner is not likely to produce strong cognitive dissonances. It is rather easy since the 
perceived costs of a strategic vote on the SMD tier can be essentially offset by a sincere vote 
for “her” party on the multi-member district tier. For instance, in Germany a strategic 
candidate vote of a small party supporter does not harm the overall seat share in parliament 
for this party (Pappi and Thurner 2002). Thus, strategic candidate votes in mixed systems are 
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essentially costless.2 This logic should be less compelling the higher the (provincial or) 
national threshold is in order to qualify for the multi-member district tier seat distribution 
according to the party vote totals. Thus, following again the notation in equation (2)  is 
still perceived to be low for a marginal party to gain a seat on the candidate vote if there is a 
high threshold for the multi-member district tier seat distribution. Consequently, the higher 
the national threshold, the less strategic voting should be observable in mixed systems. 
prefp
Fifth, if a country employs an alternative vote system, like Australia, small party 
supporters still have an incentive to rank their preferred party first even in a in a single-
member district undermining the wasted-vote logic because they always can rank a viable 
party second. If no party wins on the first count, their vote is not wasted for the second count. 
This logic is also similar to having a distribution of additional seats, since a vote might not be 
wasted if there is a second distribution to allocate votes to reminding seats. Even if the 
expectation is that there is a winner on the first count, there is still the potential to blackmail 
large parties. Thus, every vote for a small party (candidate) is not simply wasted but enhances 
the blackmailing power of such a party. Although there are incentives to vote strategically 
even in such an electoral system (Dummett, 1984:210-230), I expect that the incentives 
channeled through the district magnitude to be rather weak – analogous to national MMD 
systems employing low national thresholds. 
Summing up, I expect the Duvergerian logic to operate at the district level across 
various electoral systems, just as the Leys-Sartori conjecture posits, if the seat allocation is 
only made within the primary electoral district that does not encompass the whole country. I 
will call these systems local seat-allocation (LSA) systems as opposed to supradistrict seat-
allocation (SDSA) systems. In terms of district magnitude two types of LSA systems can be 
distinguished: There are systems with varying district magnitude greater than one. I call them 
                                                 
2 Furthermore, the Duvergerian logic is only one rational to deviate from their most preferred party. Electoral 
systems where to focus is on the national level provide additional incentives to vote strategically that do not get 
channeled through the district magnitude. Thus, a strategic vote in such systems can be the result of various 
strategies. It does not necessarily depend on the district magnitude alone.  
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local multi-member district (local MMD) systems. Consequently seat allocation systems in 
which every district has to elect one member of parliament are called single-member district 
(SMD) systems. Although, the Duvergerian logic might operate at the district level across 
various systems, this logic should be less compelling in systems with additional incentives 
that lead voters to expect that a vote for their most preferred party – even if it is a marginal 
one – might not be wasted after all. Particularly in small to middle-sized districts I expect to 
see variation across the frequency of strategic voting following the wasted vote strategy on 
the district level while these differences become less important the more seats are allocated at 
the district level. Electoral systems that provide possibilities particularly for small parties on 
the (regional or) national level to gain or loose additional seats (e.g. through national 
thresholds) or to cast several votes (or rank parties) for the same segment (tier) at the same 
time. Thus, I expect more strategic voting following the wasted-vote strategy in districts of 
local MMD systems (or LSA systems in general) than in districts of equal magnitude in 
locally adjusted systems. Nevertheless, the particular rules to allocate compensatory seats are 
not likely to be designed that luxurious that every small party supporter can expect that her 
most preferred party will eventually gain representation anyway. This is, however, essentially 
the case in national MMD systems with low national thresholds like in Israel or in the 
Netherlands or in Australia, where a vote for a marginal party is not wasted after all if there is 
a second count. Thus I still expect the incentives for strategic voting to be stronger in locally 
adjusted MMD system such that voters’ expectation about the probability that their vote will 
be wasted is systematically higher than in national MMD or alternative vote systems.  
In the following I want to stipulate five hypotheses that are going to be tested in the 
next section:  
1) The frequency of strategic voting in locally adjusted MMD and local MMD 
systems should depend on the district magnitude. The higher the district 
magnitude the lower the observed level of strategic voting.  
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2) The frequency of strategic voting following the wasted vote logic should be 
higher in a district of a given magnitude in LSA systems than in a 
comparable district of locally adjusted MMD systems. The difference should 
diminish, though, the higher the district magnitude gets. 
3) The frequency of strategic voting following the wasted vote logic should be 
higher in mixed systems than in SMD systems (or in LSA systems, in 
general). 
4) The frequency of strategic voting following the wasted vote logic should be 
higher in locally adjusted MMD than in alternative vote systems.  
5) The frequency of strategic voting following the wasted vote logic should be 
higher in locally adjusted MMD systems with small district size than in 
national MMD systems (given similar national thresholds). 
 
Hypotheses 2 to 5 yields a hierarchy of expected frequencies of strategic voters trying 
to avoid wasting their votes at the district level across various electoral systems.  
 
Figure 1: A Hierarchy of Electoral Systems to predict the Share of Strategic Voters 




Local MMD or LSA systems 
 
Locally adjusted MMD 
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 Data and Measurement 
The Leys-Sartori conjecture does not predict how much strategic voting we should expect in a 
primary electoral district with a given magnitude. It simply formulates a tendency that the 
higher the district magnitude, the less likely voters are motivated to avoid wasting their vote 
and, therefore, the lower the frequency of strategic voting in that district. My argument is that 
apart from the district magnitude we have to account for rules by which votes are translated 
into seats. This might be particularly important in order to predict the number of strategic 
voters in various electoral systems if the district magnitude is low. 
Typically, the significance of the Leys-Sartori conjecture and more generally, the 
significance of Duverger’s famous propositions is mainly discussed in the electoral systems 
literature in terms of its consequences for the (effective) number of parties that has to be 
expected given certain electoral institutions. Strategic voting following the Duvergerian logic 
- to avoid wasting the vote - is the hypothesized mechanism on the individual level that 
“explains” why only a few parties are viable in a given electoral district even if many more 
are competing for seats. Thus, contrary to the literature on electoral systems this study does 
not merely focus on the consequences of strategic voting but tries to address the incentives 
motivating a strategic vote more directly.  
Since, presumably, many features of electoral rules have an impact on the nature of the 
district race and therefore on strategic voting, some studies in this literature looking more 
closely at strategic voting use district-level rather than national-level data (Cox 1997, Cox and 
Shugart 1996, Herron and Nishikawa, 2001). Nevertheless, employing district-level data is 
only an indirect way to assess an individual-level phenomenon like strategic voting. Heroic 
assumptions about voters’ preferences as well as the well-known problems of an ecological 
fallacy plague the process of making inferences based on such a research design. Moreover, 
different strategic voting patterns might even cancel out in the aggregate and are therefore lost 
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from any analysis geared at this level of observation. Thus, on theoretical grounds, if we are 
interested in pinning down effects of electoral institutions on voting behavior, the individual 
level is the preferred level of observation to carry out any analysis about strategic voting. 
Moreover we need to introduce variance in the electoral institutions in order to compare its 
effects on voting behavior. Particularly relevant for studying strategic voting is that we are 
able to measure (sincere) preferences of a given respondent directly and compare it to her 
stated voting behavior. This is a great advantage compared to all studies that look only at 
aggregated election results (Cox 1997, Monroe and Rose 2002) because one does not need to 
make any additional assumption about voters’ preferences in order to distinguish strategic 
voting from other voting behavior.  
The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project is a almost ideal data set 
to analyze these questions. It is a cross-national project with election studies across countries 
with great variance of their electoral institutions that also provides comparable individual-
level data. In each participant country’s election study a common module of public opinion 
survey questions is included. These data contain among other things questions about turnout, 
vote choice as well as candidate and party evaluations. Moreover, systematic information 
about characteristics of the primary electoral districts as well as the electoral system at large is 
merged to the individual data. Thus, the CSES data (module 1) is especially suitable to study 
the effects of electoral institutions on citizens’ attitudes and behavior since the electoral 
systems of the participating countries do vary considerably. 3  
 Since the comparative literature about strategic voting and electoral systems 
traditionally speaks to the (primary electoral) district level I will choose the same level of 
observation in order to assess the consequences of varying district magnitude on the 
frequency of strategic voting. Thus, my dependent variable is the frequency of strategic voting 
per electoral district. In order to construct this variable I need to derive preference rankings of 
                                                 
3  I use the CSES module 1 that was released on August 4th, 2003. 
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the parties that actually field lists or candidates in a particular primary district. This also 
accounts for the complications that even within the same country voters do not necessarily 
have the same choice-set (Shikano 2003). Thus, their vote choices are menu dependent (Kedar 
2002). Party preferences are measured by standard 10-point party likes/dislike scales and 
ranked accordingly for each respondent. In mixed systems I take the candidate vote as 
relevant vote choice for my research question since only here one expects an impact of the 
district magnitude. According to my conceptualization a strategic vote following the 
Duvergerian logic is a vote for a party that is not most preferred but expected to be more 
viable. Unfortunately, an individual’s expectation cannot be assessed directly, particularly 
since in most countries the CSES module was administered as part of a post-election study. 
Assuming that on average voters expect a party to be more viable than their most preferred 
party when the former one ends up with a higher vote share than their most preferred party 
(Gschwend 2001; Karp et al. 2002: 8), my dependent variable is the percentage of votes cast 
at the electoral district level for a party with a higher expected vote share instead of a vote for 
someone’s most preferred party. This group of strategic voters is likely to follow the 
Duvergerian logic avoiding to waste a their vote.4 The advantage to define strategic voting 
this way is that it does disentangle strategic voters following a wasted-vote strategy from 
voting behavior that can be interpreted as a result of other strategies. Thus the frequencies of 
strategic voting are not falsely magnified if we, for instance, define simply every deviation 
from someone’s most preferred party as a strategic vote. One drawback is, though, that the 
estimate of the frequency of strategic voting in national MMD systems will be too high since 
small party supporters could also cast their vote for a party that they expect to be more 
                                                 
4 If respondents most prefer two parties at the same time I will count such a vote for the party that is expected to 
do better on Election Day as a strategic vote since not including expectations in their decision calculus could 
have resulted in a vote for the party that is expected to do worse. 
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successful in order to make one type of coalition government more likely. This strategy for 
PR systems is known as strategic sequencing (Cox 1997: 194-196).5
Table A1 in the appendix provides an overview about the percentages of strategic 
voters across the election studies of parliamentary elections that have all the information 
available and passed a data consistency check. The exclude category is comprised of the 
percentage of non-strategic (sincere voters and others6) voters. Thus, first, I had to delete 
countries with only presidential elections (Chile, Lithuania) and where district level 
information is not yet available (Belarus, Taiwan, Korea, Russia, Ukraine and Thailand). 
Second, after further inspection of the frequencies I deleted the data from Peru 2000 elections, 
since no vote choice variable is available. Nevertheless I included data from the Spanish 
legislative election in 2000 although the percentages of strategic voting across these districts 
seem to be rather low.  
 The key independent variable following Duverger and Leys-Sartori is the district 
magnitude. What exactly is the relationship between the district magnitude and the propensity 
that a voter considers voting for a different party than her most preferred one? So far no 
agreement about the correct functional form is reached. In the comparative electoral system 
literature some scholars assume a simple linear relationship (e.g., Cox and Shugart, 1996; Cox 
1997) while others argue (Monroe and Rose, 2002; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989) that this 
relationship has to be non-linear. I, again, tried both versions and since the results are almost 
identical I report the analysis with the district magnitude simply measured by the size of it.  
 
Frequency of Strategic Voting and Rules of Seat Allocation 
In order to take a look at the expected frequencies of strategic voting across electoral systems 
employing various seat-allocation rules I create a set of dummy variables, scoring one if the 
                                                 
5 I replicated my entire analysis with counting every vote that deviates from someone’s most preferred party as a 
strategic vote with qualitative similar results.  
6  The ‘other’ category is, for instance, comprised of voters of a party that is not being evaluated on the 
corresponding party likes/dislikes scale. 
 17
electoral district belongs to a country that employs a particular seat-allocation rule and zero 
otherwise. Thus, I create a dummy for SMD (Canada, UK, USA), local MMD (Switzerland, 
Spain, Peru, Portugal, Slovenia), locally adjusted MMD (Belgium, Czech Republic, Hong 
Kong, Denmark, Island, Norway, Sweden, Poland, Romania), national MMD (Israel, the 
Netherlands), alternative (Australia) and for mixed (Germany, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, 
Mexico) systems that are incorporated in the CSES (module 1) data.  
Since the frequency of strategic voting per district is calculated over a different 
number individuals, estimation a least square regression model is fine but every observation 
has to be weighted inversely proportional to its variance in order to make the assumption of a 
constant error variance more believable. In this case the weights are the number of 
respondents per electoral district that gave rise to the observation of the frequency of strategic 
voting in an electoral district. The estimation results of a weighted least (WLS) regression of 
the frequency of strategic voting on the set of dummies, excluding the constant, are presented 
the following table 1. Note all estimates are accompanied with robust (Huber-White) standard 
errors and their corresponding 95 % confidence interval. 
 
Table 1: Estimated Frequency of Strategic Voting across various Systems of 
Seat Allocation Rules 
 Dependent Variable 
 Frequency of Strategic Voting 
Independent Variables Coef. Std. Err. 95% CI 
SMD  9.10 0.46 8.20 10.00 
Local MMD  9.55 0.79 8.00 11.10 LS
A 
Local MMD - District Magnitude ---    
Locally adjusted  7.18 0.40 6.40 7.96 
Locally adjusted - District Magnitude ---    
National MMD 9.81 1.81 6.26 13.36 





Mixed 12.55 0.50 11.56 13.53 
N 1951    
R-squared 0.57    
Root MSE 8.41    
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More than half of the variance of the frequency of strategic voting at the primary district level 
is accounted for by the variance across various systems of seat allocation rules. First thing to 
note is that on average the frequency of strategic voting does not differ systematically within 
LSA systems. Thus it seems reasonable to collapse SMD and local MMD system into one 
category. Table 1 shows that one can expect in SMD systems on average 9.1 % of all voters 
following the wasted-vote strategy in order to avoid wasting their vote on a smaller party 
while around 9.5 % do so on average in local MMD systems.  
Second, these results also make transparent that the expected frequency of strategic 
voting differs considerably across SDSA systems. In Australia, on average, only about 5.5 % 
cast a strategic vote per district while in locally adjusted MMD systems this number is 
significantly higher as expected in hypothesis 4. Interestingly, looking at the estimate for 
mixed systems, in the SMD-tier of mixed electoral systems the share of strategic voters is 
significantly higher than in SMD systems (or in LSA systems in general) without a second tier 
supporting hypothesis 3. Two explanations come to mind. First, these are merely country- or 
election-specific effects. Maybe German voters in 1998, for instance, are simply more 
inclined to vote strategically than voters in the US in 1996. Second, and theoretically certainly 
more illuminating, there are stronger incentives for strategic voting on the candidate vote in 
mixed electoral systems than in SMD systems, presumably arising from the second tier. Thus, 
this might be interpreted as another piece of evidence for the existence of contamination or 
interaction effect. Apparently, in mixed electoral systems various seat-allocation rules 
influence one another. Voters do not see their candidate and party vote as independent from 
one another. 
Nevertheless, nothing is said yet about the impact of the district magnitude on the 
frequency of strategic voting. Therefore I will refine my estimation strategy and also include 
two further variables that measure the impact of district magnitude on two types of seat-
allocation systems where the district magnitude varies within such a type: Local and locally 
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adjusted MMD systems. The WLS estimation results, together with robust (Huber-White) 
standard errors and their corresponding 95 % confidence intervals are summarized in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Estimated Frequency of Strategic Voting across various Systems of 
Seat Allocation accounting for Variance in District Magnitude 
 Dependent Variable 
 Frequency of Strategic Voting 
Independent Variables Coef. Std. Err. 95% CI 
SMD  9.10 0.46 8.20 10.00 
Local MMD (constant) 9.59 1.09 7.46 11.73 LS
A 
Local MMD - District Magnitude 0.00 0.06 -0.12 0.11 
Locally adjusted (constant)  8.70 0.72 7.29 10.12 
Locally adjusted - District Magnitude -0.12 0.04 -0.21 -0.03 
National MMD 9.81 1.81 6.25 13.36 





Mixed 12.55 0.50 11.56 13.53 
N 1951    
R-squared 0.57    
Root MSE 8.39    
 
First, contrary to hypothesis 1 district magnitude does not seem to nontrivially reduce the 
frequency of strategic voting in electoral systems where the seat allocation is done merely on 
the local level. If there were any systematic influence that gets channeled through the district 
magnitude we would expect that this effect shows up precisely in these systems without any 
incentives that undermine the wasted-vote logic. For the expected frequency reduction of 
strategic voting per district magnitude in locally adjusted MMD systems one gets a small but 
nevertheless nontrivial estimate. On can expect not more than about two tenth of a percentage 
point less strategic voting for every additional seat that is distributed in an average district in 
locally adjusted MMD systems.  
Second, this estimation strategy allows us to directly compare the expected frequency 
of strategic voting across various electoral systems and various seat-allocation rules of 
primary electoral districts where only one seats is allocated. Again, for primary districts of 
magnitude one there is no systematic difference within LSA systems. On average on can 
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expect about 9.6 % (= 9.59 – .003) strategic voters following the wasted-vote logic in local 
MMD systems while about a half percentage point less in SMD systems. Within SDSA 
systems on can expect in single-member districts of locally adjusted MMD systems about 
8.6 % (= 8.70 - .12) strategic voters per district. This is significantly higher than the predicted 
corresponding frequency in alternative vote systems (Australia being the only country that fits 
this category), again, supporting hypothesis 4 and, moreover, is significantly lower than the 
predicted corresponding frequency in mixed systems supporting hypothesis 3.  
Third, there is, unfortunately, no systematic difference of the frequency of strategic 
voting following the wasted vote logic in national MMD systems than in locally adjusted 
MMD systems rejecting hypothesis 5. Since there are only two districts among all 
observations that stem from national MMD systems (the Netherlands and Israel) there might 
be a “small N problem” behind the large confidence intervals. Further iterations will include 
data from additional elections. If we would only take the respective value for Israel (6.2%, see 
table A1) than hypothesis 5 still holds up to a district margin of 14. Beyond that, in 
accordance with this hypothesis, the frequency of strategic voting in locally adjusted MMD 
does not get smaller than the respective value for Israel. Thus a locally adjusted MMD system 
with district size 15 and higher does provide essentially no more or less incentives to deviate 
from someone’s most preferred party in order to avoid wasting their votes than a national 
MMD system (given that the national thresholds of the considered national MMD systems are 
reasonably small). 
Nevertheless, given the differences of the system-specific constants on might ask, 
whether the expected frequency of these systems is still different even for districts with a 
large magnitude? To provide evidence for the remaining hypotheses I simulated the expected 
frequency of strategic voting depending on the size of the district magnitude based on the 
estimation results above. The following graph summarizes these results. The lower regression 
line represents the simulated expected frequencies for locally adjusted and the upper line the 
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corresponding one for local MMD systems. Every simulation is accompanied with their 95 % 
confidence interval based on robust (Huber-White) standard errors. 
 
Figure 2: Estimated impact of the District Magnitude on the Frequency of Strategic 
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local MMD systems 
locally adjusted MMD systems 
 
Since it is problematic to simulate hypothetical scenarios that are too far away from the data I 
only predict the frequency of strategic voting following the wasted-vote strategy for districts 
with district magnitudes that are actually represented in the data. For these predictions I used 
the coefficients of the above table.7 The range of the district magnitude of primary electoral 
districts is a bid wider for local MMD systems than for locally adjusted MMD systems. Most 
importantly, though, this graph makes transparent that even across the entire range of actual 
(observed) district magnitudes, the frequency of strategic voting is on average higher in LSA 
                                                 
7 The analysis is carried out using Stata 8.1 and in order to simulated predicted probabilities I employed Clarify 
2.1 (Tomz et al, 2003; King et al., 2000). 
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than in locally adjusted MMD systems. For districts with a magnitude between 13 and about 
35 this difference is significantly different supporting the hypothesis 2. 
 
Conclusion 
The workings of electoral laws have not only profound and well-known consequences for the 
party system, the type of government and the nature of representation in general. It also has an 
impact on the way people make decisions in then voting booth. Some voters anticipate the 
outcome of an election because they form expectations about it and act accordingly. The way 
these expectations play out seem to differ systematically across various electoral systems. 
Since voting behavior is not only situational but also dispositional determined I distinguished 
situational and dispositional criteria of how voters generate expectations about the probability 
that their vote is not wasted on her most preferred party. Here I focused on the situational 
criteria that operate at the primary district level, possibly taming the incentives that get 
channeled through the district magnitude, that have an impact on the frequency of strategic 
voting.  
As expected, the Leys-Sartori conjecture, predicting that the smaller the district 
magnitude the more strategic voting at the primary district level, does not hold. Particularly, 
the level of strategic voting at the district level is related to the district magnitude in locally 
adjusted MMD systems but not so across local MMD systems. On the one hand it could be 
that one has to think more precisely about the effects of various thresholds on the district, 
regional and national level that might systematically undermine the Duvergerian logic to 
avoid wasting a vote on a small party. On the other hand, not only voters but particularly 
political parties are also likely to adjust their behavior according to the incentives by the 
electoral system and do not field candidates or a party list if they are not likely to win at least 
one seat. This might already eliminate or pre-empt possible wasted-vote calculations on the 
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voters’ side and makes it particularly hard to find a significant effect for the district 
magnitude. 
The aim of this paper is to provide a hierarchy of electoral systems that helps to 
predict the share of strategic voters following the wasted vote strategy. The results are clear:  
 
 
Figure 3: A observed Hierarchy of Electoral Systems to predict the Share of Strategic 
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There is meaningful variation across the frequency of strategic voting following the wasted-
vote strategy on the district level above and beyond the levels that can be attributed to 
incentives that get channeled through the district magnitude. These results are summarized in 
the above figure. For the candidate vote in mixed systems one can expect the highest share of 
voters that follow the wasted-vote strategy while there are apparently almost no incentives for 
voters in an alternative vote system to deviate from their most preferred party in order to cast 
a vote for a party that is expected to do better at the polls. LSA and locally adjusted systems 
take up middle positions while the simulated predictions made transparent that in locally 
adjusted systems one does not expect on average more strategic voters following a wasted-
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vote strategy than in LSA systems. Particularly for a wide range of electoral districts (with a 
district magnitude between 13 and 35) as expected one, in fact, can find more strategic voting 
in local MMD systems than in locally adjusted MMD systems. The analysis made also clear 
that one needs to have more data on national MMD systems in order to systematically test 
hypothesis regarding the expected number of strategic voters or parliamentary parties in such 
systems. 
The systematic differences resulting from the variation in the institutional context are 
generally more pronounced at the district level across electoral systems the smaller the 
particular district magnitude gets. Thus, contrary to the electoral systems literature the results 
of this paper indicate that the impact of the district magnitude on the frequency of strategic 
voting and therefore, more generally, on the (effective) number of parties in a given polity is 
conditional on the type of rules employed that translate votes into parliamentary seats. The 
incentives that get channeled through the district magnitude are not constant across various 
seat allocation systems. The differences across various electoral rules become less important 
in order to predict the share of strategic voters that have to be expected in a given polity the 




Table A1: Frequency of Strategic Voting by Election Study– CSES Module 1 across 
various Systems of Seat Allocation. 








national MMD Israel 6.2 
 Netherlands 11.8 
 
Mixed Germany 16.2 
 Hungary 3.2 
 Japan 8.8 
 Mexico ('00) 6.3 
 Mexico ('97) 16.9 
 New Zealand 15.3 
 
Alternative vote Australia 5.5 
 
Locally adjusted MMD Belgium 7.9 
 Czech Republic 4.2 
 Denmark 5.8 
 Hong Kong ('00) 9.6 
 Hong Kong ('98) 11.7 
 Island 3.5 
 Norway 5.5 
 Poland 10.7 
 Romania 14.1 
 Sweden 3.2 
 
Local MMD Peru ('01) 9.0 
 Portugal 12.0 
 Slovenia 10.0 
 Spain ('00) 1.5 
 Spain ('96) 12.5 
 Switzerland 13.1 
 
SMD Canada 8.1 
 UK 9.2 
 USA 8.8 
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